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Is school choice nefarious, for students of color and for everyone else?
Or is it helpful? Debates over this question, now decades old, are feeling a
bit stale. Diane Ravitch’s just-published Reign of Error breaks no new ground
when it accuses those of us who sympathize with school choice of embracing
“a radical ideology with a fundamental distrust of public education and
hostility to the public sector in general.”1 And Justice Clarence Thomas,
were he to read Ravitch, likely would feel no need to update his 2002
denunciation of “cognoscenti who oppose vouchers,” who elevate their
“romanticized ideal of universal public education” above the real needs of
“urban families [who] just want the best education for their children.”2
One reason for stalemate is that the debate’s participants often avoid
declaring, and often purposely obfuscate, whether they disagree about
principle or about tactics. Advocates on both sides love to talk about whether
schools of choice are effective, as if people generally agree about what
constitutes an effective school. They are also fond of accusing their
interlocutors of harboring and hiding distasteful ideological commitments.3

Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor
Osamudia James for her article and for her comments on an earlier version of this Response. I
also appreciate the useful comments of R.A. Lenhardt and Kimani Paul-Emile.
1. DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION MOVEMENT AND
THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 19 (2013).
2. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 682 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
3. See JEFFREY R. HENIG, SPIN CYCLE 34 (2008) (“[K]ey interest groups have been
unwilling or unable to find common ground; any movement toward a position of compromise
is resisted as symbolic defeat, a first step down a slippery path toward either a Leviathan
government or a Wild West scenario in which corporations run amok and the only consumers
who count are those with cash in their pockets.”). For examples, see Zelman, 536 U.S. at 682
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that opponents of school vouchers that can be redeemed at
religious schools “raise formalistic concerns about the Establishment Clause but ignore the core
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Disappointingly few acknowledge their positions’ deep roots in their own
conceptions of justice—conceptions that are far from commanding
universal assent.
In this respect, the explicit normativity of Professor Osamudia James’s
Opt-Out Education is refreshing. Equality, James tells us, ought to trump
liberty when it comes to schools. Indeed, “the ideal[] [of] . . . individual
liberty . . . [is] arguably completely inappropriate in a public school
setting.”4 “If our goal is equality, then choice must be minimized.”5 To put it
this way is to acknowledge that many disagreements about school choice
stem from foundational disagreement about the aspirations of this society
and its goals for children. The choice debate, in many respects, instantiates
the republic’s longstanding contest between equality and liberty.
Reconciling the tension between these values is of course a perennially
difficult undertaking, but it is helpful to identify it as the task at hand.
At the same time, the school choice debate is not exclusively about
conflicts between high principles. Another argument favored by opponents
of school choice is that for many people it is not “choice” at all because it is
deeply constrained by “social, racial, and economic isolation.”6 According to
this view, choice opposes not only equality but also freedom; it enhances
liberty only for those who already enjoy racial and economic privilege. There
are two problems with this claim. First, constrained choice—even when
constraints are very substantial—is still choice. Second, traditional public
schooling is deeply shaped by the same social, racial, and economic isolation
that limits choice. As Professor James admits, the condition of many public
schools that serve racially segregated, poor neighborhoods accounts for
much of the demand for alternatives in those communities.7 To the choice
advocate, meeting such demand, and a fortiori subsidizing it with public
funds, clearly improves welfare, even in an environment of constraint.
A third variety of argument condemns choice as a matter of political
strategy. The signal contribution of Professor James’s Article is to argue that
choice, by displacing responsibility for bad outcomes from the public sector
to the choosing parents, undermines public enthusiasm for tackling the
deep injustices that marginalize students of color and the poor and

purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment” that school choice would serve); JOHN E. CHUBB &
TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 12 (1990) (noting that opponents
of choice seek to preserve “their jobs, revenues, and economic security”); RAVITCH, supra note
1, at 22–26 (although “some” pro-choice reformers “sincerely believe” in its merits, many are
“partisan,” “powerful and wealthy,” “deeply reactionary,” and motivated by money and personal
ambition).
4. Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 1083, 1098 (2014).
5. Id. at 1129.
6. Id. at 1121.
7. Id. at 1085–86.
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complicates efforts to build political coalitions to tackle those problems.
Exit, to use the classic categories, mutes voice.
The claim that the atomistic, individualistic neoliberalism of choice
dampens the capacity of the polity to confront structural problems of
racism, poverty, housing, food insecurity, and healthcare is intriguing both
as a critical and an empirical observation. It is not, however, a strong policy
objection to school choice. In a society already dominated by individualism
and market values, and enduringly infected by racism, the new political
coalitions that Professor James imagines are unlikely successfully to
overcome intractable problems of social inequality. A better strategy, I think,
is to capitalize upon the interest convergence between marginalized and
privileged groups that school choice offers. Removing some number of
poor, minority students from failing public schools and educating them
instead in charters or in other kinds of schools that they and their families
prefer will perhaps create better-educated citizens who can effectively
participate in, and even lead, socially progressive coalitions. This outcome is
far from guaranteed. But it seems more plausible than the hope that by
foreclosing exit from bad public schools, we will galvanize the polity to fix
public schools, whose distress it has over many decades proved itself more
than willing to tolerate.
I.

WHAT IS “PUBLIC” SCHOOL?

There is great appeal to prioritizing equality when it comes to educating
children. Pick your adjective: American educational inequality is a
dispiriting, festering, appalling morass, made even more ignominious by the
often fulsome commitment of American political culture to equality of
educational opportunity in the abstract. When it comes to schooling, the
prosperous and entitled rich routinely exercise privilege and power to the
detriment of the vulnerable and the subordinated. School choice, however,
cannot properly be characterized solely or even primarily as such an
exercise.
Education undertakes to inculcate patterns of thought, moral behavior,
and citizenship in the young. We have long understood that such an
enterprise demands “basic value choices on which school policy and practice
are based.”8 Such choices are simultaneously central to the democratic
project and deeply controversial. Unlike Milliken v. Bradley, Pierce v. Society of
Sisters is not a Potemkin case that gins up tendentious arguments in a
transparent effort to protect the powerful at the expense of everyone else.
Pierce’s objections that children are not “mere creature[s] of the State” were
and remain genuine.9 Likewise its claim that parents’ prerogative to direct

8. Stephen Arons, The Separation of School and State: Pierce Reconsidered, 46 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 76, 78 (1976).
9. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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their children’s education is “fundamental” to liberty.10 Oregon parents did
not seek religious instruction from the Society of Sisters because they felt
“that it’s not enough for their kids to win: others must lose.”11 They were
dissenters and the targets of bigotry.12 At the time of Pierce, it was the Ku
Klux Klan whose platform called for mandatory public schooling,13 and
democrats like John Dewey who argued that the availability of alternative
options reflected “American toleration and trust and good faith between
various elements of the population and in each other.”14
By no means does the KKK’s endorsement of public school monopoly a
century ago contaminate by association the views of those who urge
compulsory public education under contemporary circumstances.15 But
private schooling was, in the 1920s, a genuine protection of liberty for the
persecuted and the marginalized. We have relatively powerless dissenters
today too—dissenters as to religion, to be sure, but also as to methods of
discipline, as to pedagogy, and, yes, even as to curriculum in fraught areas
like history and science.16 Their liberty interests are neither trivial nor
pretextual.17
For the same reasons, I am reluctant to treat the choices of relatively
powerless persons necessarily as “false choices.”18 Minority communities like
majority ones, poor ones like rich ones, include dissenters who object to
various orthodoxies and to public monopolies that perpetuate them. And
they include persons for whom freedom to dissent, and to educate their
children consistently with that dissent, resonates more deeply than the
claims of equality. Justice Thomas, surely among that group, begins his
Zelman concurrence by quoting Frederick Douglass: “[e]ducation . . . means
emancipation. It means light and liberty. It means the uplifting of the soul
of man into the glorious light of truth, the light by which men can only be

10. Id.
11. James, supra note 4, at 1128 n.203 (quoting Alfie Kohn, Only for My Kid: How Privileged
Parents Undermine School Reform, PHI DELTA KAPPAN (Apr. 1998), http://www.alfiekohn.org/
teaching/ofmk.htm).
12. David B. Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case, 74 AM. HIST.
REV. 74, 83–85 (1968).
13. Id. at 79–81.
14. Id. at 82 (quoting John Dewey, The School as a Means of Developing a Social Consciousness and
Social Ideals in Children, 1 J. SOC. FORCES 513, 515 (1923)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. For examples of legal scholarship arguing for mandatory public education instead of
additional choice, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today,
52 AM. U. L. REV. 1461, 1472–73 (2003); James, supra note 4; James S. Liebman, Voice, Not
Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 302, 307 (1991) (reviewing CHUBB & MOE, supra note 3).
16. See PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE
DISTANCE 297–300 (2003).
17. Arons, supra note 8, at 89.
18. James, supra note 4, at 1085.
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made free.”19 Whether the first goal of education is liberty or equality is
genuinely a matter over which reasonable people of conviction disagree.
This is a large part of the explanation for the consistent failure of the
African American public and its institutions to generate consensus about
school choice.20
There is also the incontrovertible truth that, absent charters or
vouchers, American educational localism itself establishes an insidious
system of school choice. That the nation’s fifteen thousand local school
districts each fund and manage monopoly public schools in their own
geographical purviews invites Americans to choose their public schools by
choosing where to live.21 This peculiar system of choice, propped up by
racial segregation, economic stratification, and Milliken’s holding that
segregation in one district is not susceptible to remedies that involve
another, is particularly harmful to racial minorities and the economically
disadvantaged. To choose an integrated school means that one must choose
to live in an integrated jurisdiction or neighborhood. Similarly, to choose a
good school means to pay for a house or an apartment, the price of which
bundles all sorts of expensive public and private goods together.22 The rich
can afford the bundle, while the educationally oriented poor are deprived of
access to à la carte pricing.23 This is no kind of equality.
Because Milliken is itself “a notable example of choice in education,”24
because the system of post-Milliken, pre-voucher American schools “sanitizes
unequal access to the societal good of education”25 at least as much as
charters and vouchers do, then one must argue carefully about why marketbased choice is better or worse for equality than Milliken-based choice. One
surely ought not compare the anti-egalitarian consequences of school choice
as practiced—vouchers and charters with their real-life warts—to publicsector monopoly schooling as it would exist in an ideal world, where schools
are integrated “inclusive communit[ies]” that are of high quality and enjoy
ample public support.26 The proper question is whether market-based

19. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 676 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Blessings of Liberty and Education: An Address Delivered in
Manassas, Virginia, on 3 September 1894, in 5 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 616, 623 (John
W. Blassingame & John R. McKivigan eds., 1992)).
20. See LISA M. STULBERG, RACE, SCHOOLS, AND HOPE: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND SCHOOL
CHOICE AFTER BROWN 89–91 (2008); Kevin J. Dougherty & Lizabeth Sostre, Minerva and the
Market: The Sources of the Movement for School Choice, in THE CHOICE CONTROVERSY 24, 31–33
(Peter W. Cookson, Jr. ed., 1992).
21. Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support “Public” Schools, 48 B.C. L. REV.
909, 911–12 (2007).
22. See SCHUCK, supra note 16, at 305.
23. Saiger, supra note 21, at 921.
24. James, supra note 4, at 1092.
25. Id. at 1088.
26. Id. at 1129.
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choice reduces equality relative to our already racialized and unequal system
based upon geographic choice.
This leaves me rooting for those who, like Professor James, want to talk
about choice explicitly in terms of tradeoffs between equality and liberty.
The work of doing so, however, still lies before us. The task going forward is
to delineate how a society that values both can reason together across deep
and thoughtful disagreement about which should take precedence in the
context of schooling. It is insufficient to say that choice is “inherently
incompatible” with public education because “[p]ublic schools are about the
public.”27 Schools can be public in the sense of being publicly regulated,
publicly managed, publicly subsidized, or publicly provided; they can be
public in the sense of being open to any child, free of charge for all, or
compulsory across the board; they can be public because they are take-it-orleave-it common resources, like parks, or they can be public notwithstanding
that they are commoditized and differentiated.28 That we have associated a
particular kind of “publicness” with public schools for the past century or so,
since the rise of the Progressive common-school movement, does not mean
that other ways of being public are incoherent or out of bounds. What we
have to discuss, across the range of what can fairly be called systems of public
education, is the balance between equality and liberty that each offers us
and how we should value those tradeoffs.
II. WHAT IS “GENUINE CHOICE”?
I have argued to this point that it is helpful to think about school choice
in terms of liberty and equality and that it advances matters to think
explicitly about tradeoffs between them. But one also encounters arguments
that school choice, in many contexts, “can hardly be said to be genuine
choice at all.”29 On this view, choice as practiced—voucher and charter
programs as actually implemented—not only exacerbate inequality but also
fail to enhance liberty. This is because the “choices” they offer to parents of
little privilege are impoverished and illusory.
It caricatures school choice advocacy to suggest that “genuine
choice . . . can be integral to self-actualization, dignity, and equality”30 only if
choices are diverse, rich, and multifarious. The ideas of a quasi-market and
of consumer sovereignty do not depend for their force on the fantastic
possibility that all options are equally available to everyone, or that people
must choose free of constraint—even of “severely limit[ing]” constraint.31
27. Id. , at 1119.
28. See HENIG, supra note 3, at 51–52.
29. James, supra note 4, at 1119.
30. Id. at 1102; see also KENT GREENFIELD, THE MYTH OF CHOICE 119–22 (2011) (arguing
that the benefits and prevalence of choice in economic markets are often misstated or simply
incorrect).
31. James, supra note 4, at 1104.
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Basic welfare economics rely upon the budget constraint: consumers working
under those constraints realize consumer welfare nonetheless, because the
market provides them with goods and services at prices below the value they
assign to them.32 One can except Jean Valjean, “choosing” only pro forma
between theft and starvation, and still recognize that many poor persons
enjoy economic agency with respect to many transactions.
Among such transactions are surely K–12 enrollment decisions under
choice programs, which universally provide parents with public subsidies.
There can be little doubt that more economic welfare can be had if
consumers direct a subsidy than if the state does it for them. One might
rather (all else equal) be a rich parent in Princeton, New Jersey, deciding
between an excellent local public school or a competing charter that
emphasizes traditional pedagogy,33 than an inner-city parent choosing
between a distressed public school and a back-to-basics affinity charter.34 But
this does not mean that parents with unsatisfying choices are not choosing.
Nor is it res ipsa loquitur that some charter schools report poor
academic achievement that is even worse than their competitor: traditional
public schools.35 Choice does not guarantee good results. No serious person
can claim that it does. But that choice is less than a panacea does not imply
that the institutional form is a conspiracy of the powerful or that it exploits
information asymmetries of marginalized minority parents.36 Contra Chubb
and Moe, bad traditional public schools are not invariably bad because they
are traditional public schools;37 too many good traditional public schools
give lie to that assertion. For the same reason, low-quality charter and
voucher schools do not imply that charters and vouchers are intrinsically of
low quality. In particular, that several jurisdictions have yanked charters
from schools that fail to post minimally adequate test scores does not
demonstrate chartering’s failure.38 Quite the opposite: it shows a regulated
market capable of self-correction.
Moreover, choice advocates are right to reject the elitist argument that
academic quality is the only measure of public schooling. Two schools that
post similar levels of measured academic achievement are not necessarily
similar across the board. Poor and rich parents alike might have very good
reasons for thinking one better, even much better, than the other. Parents

32. Cf. GREENFIELD, supra note 30, at 122 (“The market also limits choices.”).
33. See CHIARA R. NAPPI, WHY CHARTER SCHOOLS?: THE PRINCETON STORY (1999), available
at http://www.edexcellence.net/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs/wcs_8.pdf.
34. See James, supra note 4, at 1115.
35. Id. at 1085–86, 1097.
36. See id. at 1105.
37. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 3, at 26–27.
38. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, THE STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOL
AUTHORIZING: 2010, at 45–47 & fig.2.9 (2011), available at http://www.qualitycharters.org/
assets/files/images/stories/publications/2010_facts_report.pdf.
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reasonably choose schools along many dimensions orthogonal to math and
reading scores: strength in the sciences, humanities, arts and music;
particular pedagogical approaches; small classes or small schools; school
cultures of discipline (for some) or nurturance (for others). One should
have sympathy for parents in a dangerous neighborhood who trade some
academic quality for safety, or for parents working double shifts who need
their kids to walk alone to school and so trade quality for proximity to
home,39 just as one can appreciate the motives of a rich parent who rejects a
traditional math-and-English public school in favor of a competing,
constructivist, arts-oriented charter that posts lower test scores. All these
choices make sense to me; and what matters, of course, is that they make
sense to the chooser. I cannot agree that even such choices are not made in
“an education market, but rather a racialized social market.”40 School is about
academics but also about arts, about safety, and about social communities.41
The market reflects it all, and in that market parents choose, from the
available menu, the packages that they want.
One should not romanticize markets. They are imperfect. They
sometimes fail. They rest upon preferences that many of us dislike. This is
true of markets both competitive and monopolistic, heavily regulated and
lightly regulated. Some schools of choice are incompetent and some are
even corrupt,42 just like traditional public schools. But it is striking that
Professor James repeatedly mentions food insecurity, inadequate housing,
and the inaccessibility of healthcare as contributors to the educational
distress of poor communities43 because this nation addresses all three in
substantial part through subsidized vouchers redeemable in open, if
regulated, marketplaces. In the case of food, where the externalities that one
person’s consumption places upon others’ are minimal, the voucher
approach is universal and nearly entirely uncontroversial. Notwithstanding
minor regulation at the margin, everyone can see why it is better to let SNAP
recipients exercise personal choices among groceries on store shelves than

39. See James, supra note 4, at 1105 n.91.
40. Id.
41. See MARK SCHNEIDER ET AL., CHOOSING SCHOOLS 87–95 & fig.4.1 (2000) (reviewing
factors parents “find important” in schools); Eric A. Hanushek, Throwing Money at Schools, 1 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 19, 34 (1981) (asserting rationality of choosing schools for “pleasant
surroundings, athletic facilities, [or] cultural advantages”); Bretten Kleitz et al., Choice, Charter
Schools, and Household Preferences, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 846, 847 (2000) (reviewing prior literature
raising “[s]erious questions . . . about the validity of” the claim “that all households seek the
same thing from schools—quality education”); Kent L. Tedin & Gregory R. Weiher,
Racial/Ethnic Diversity and Academic Quality as Components of School Choice, 66 J. POL. 1109,
1111–12, 1130–32 (2004) (analyzing the relationship between preferences for school quality
and diversity, and also noting preferences for “teaching moral values”).
42. James, supra note 4, at 1106 n.102.
43. Id. at 1089 n.15.
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to issue each of them an identical food basket.44 With respect to housing,
Section 8 vouchers have been deployed in no small part because choice can,
in addition to SNAP-style direct welfare benefits associated with choice,
ameliorate externalities related to the residential concentration of poverty.45
With respect to healthcare, where externalities are perhaps even greater, the
nation provides and subsidizes consumer choice among providers, both
under multiple-payer schemes like that of the Affordable Care Act and
under single-payer programs like Medicare. All charter and voucher
programs, it is worth noting, are “single-payer.”
These sectors do not perfectly parallel schooling. Nevertheless the
partial analogies they offer are instructive. Each makes vivid the
incontrovertible welfare benefits that private choice offers relative to public
assignment. Housing and healthcare highlight, as well, the potential of
consumer choice to mitigate as much as to exacerbate spillover effects.
Surely these analogies suggest at least why it is not obvious that bad or
inadequate choices should lead us to limit choices further. The alternative
approach is to multiply options, expand their range and quality, and
develop regulatory tools to address market failures. Policy levers that could
accomplish this are available, and I have argued in favor of many of them.
Raise voucher amounts.46 Increase per-student charter subsidies.47 Repeal
caps on the number of charter schools in a jurisdiction.48 Develop rich,
diverse, and culturally competent methods to communicate useful
information about school options to parents. Vest chartering authority in
institutions other than school districts.49 Expand the geographic scope of
choice programs from cities to metropolitan areas.50 Force suburban

44. But see Tina Rosenberg, To Fight Obesity, a Carrot, and a Stick, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2013,
2:35 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/to-fight-obesity-a-carrot-and-astick (arguing in favor of limiting food stamps to healthier foods). Cf. JAMES C. OHLS & HAROLD
BEEBOUT, THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM 12–18 (1993) (documenting the shift from a
commodities distribution program to one of coupons that permit food aid recipients to select
groceries in the general marketplace).
45. See Sara Aronchick Solow, Note, Racial Justice at Home: The Case for Opportunity-Housing
Vouchers, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 503–04 & n.86 (2010) (noting Congress’s expectation
that Section 8 vouchers would reduce the concentration of poverty, and suggesting reforms that
would further that goal); see also Paulette J. Williams, The Continuing Crisis in Affordable Housing:
Systemic Issues Requiring Systemic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 443 (2004) (reviewing
HUD data on residential concentrations of poverty).
46. Saiger, supra note 21, at 957.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 959–60.
49. See Sebastian Mallaby, A Bridge for the Underclass, WASH. POST (June 13, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/12/AR2005061201418.html
(“[G]iving school boards power over charter schools’ facilities is like entrusting decisions on Wal-Mart
to Costco.”).
50. Saiger, supra note 21, at 958–59.
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jurisdictions to admit non-resident students who choose their schools.51
Minimize creaming by eliminating default placements, requiring all families
actively to choose.52 Enlist religious educators in choice programs.53
These are changes well within our grasp. Moreover, they should
command support across existing cleavages, uniting those who favor more
choice with those who favor choice only if it is “genuine.”
III. THE POLITICS OF COMMODIFICATION AND CONVERGENCE
A third argument against choice, developed by Opt-Out Education at
length, is that market institutions catalyze politics that make it harder for
this society to confront and address the root causes of its educational
problems.
Michael Sandel has recently argued that the commodification
associated with choice generates a particular mindset: “Putting a price on
the good things in life can corrupt them.”54 Commodifying schools in
particular “erodes the sense of community obligation to others” and the
centrality of collaboration in schooling, adds Professor James.55 Choice also
obscures the ways that structural problems like poverty and inadequate,
segregated housing worsen educational outcomes.
Most critically, the mindset of marketized education foregrounds
concepts of responsibility and of blame.56 By asking parents to choose,
governments encourage them and everyone else to adopt the view that they
are responsible for their choices. The concomitant conclusion is that bad
outcomes are their own fault57—an effect multiplied manyfold when
choosing parents are not white. In particular, Professor James elucidates the
potential of choice to exacerbate the identification of educational
deficiencies with supposed cultural deficiencies of students, their parents,
and their communities. This is an observation both disturbing and
important.
At one level, this set of claims makes a descriptive claim about American
politics. Markets offer no panacea. Even when functioning well and

51. Cf. Liebman, supra note 15, at 299–300.
52. This is the practice in New York City’s system of universal public high school choice.
See High School Admissions: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), at 1–2, N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://schools.nyc.gov/ChoicesEnrollment/High/Resources/default.htm (follow “Frequently
Asked Questions” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2, 2014); cf. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu et al., The New
York City High School Match, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 364, 365–66 (2005).
53. See generally Aaron Saiger, Charter Schools, the Establishment Clause, and the Neoliberal Turn
in Public Education, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1163 (2013).
54. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 9 (2012).
55. James, supra note 4, at 1106 (“[Commodification] alienates individuals from the
community nature of public schooling.”).
56. Id. at 1086; accord Christopher Lubienski, Instrumentalist Perspectives on the “Public” in
Public Education: Incentives and Purposes, 17 EDUC. POL’Y 478, 482, 497 (2003).
57. James, supra note 4, at 1086.
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regulated optimally, they alone cannot cure educational distress in
economically and racially segregated communities. Given that choice, even
at its best, will leave much educational dysfunction in place and given that
choices on offer are often deeply unsatisfactory, Professor James is right to
critique the political ascendancy of choice, which she says catalyzes a politics
of blaming parents and children for the problems that will inevitably persist.
A program of education reform broader than choice, and one that locates
responsibility in the state rather than in its less powerful members, is clearly
necessary.
But observations like these about the politics of choice also address
questions of political strategy. Given its imperfections, should choice be
rolled back, tolerated, or advanced? As I asked at the opening, is choice
helpful? As to that question, James advocates rollback. One of her reasons is
that the availability of choice makes it harder to develop political coalitions
that fight educational inequity effectively.58
This claim is in striking counterpoint to a different view of the political
landscape, one that urges those who seek educational equity to capitalize
upon, rather than shun, interest convergences between the educational
preferences of relatively rich, relatively white suburbanites and poorer, less
white families in urban and rural districts. Under this latter view, the lock
that privileged suburban interests enjoy over education policy, centered as it
is in state legislatures, state courts, and local districts, is something just short
of an iron law; to promote equity or any other goal, one must work with it
rather than merely bemoaning it. The argument for this claim, which cites
the history of desegregation and re-segregation, Milliken, school finance
litigation, and the accountability movement, has been developed at length,
most prominently by James Ryan of the Harvard School of Education.59 In
his view, choice is an instance of potential interest convergence that might
allow real improvement in distressed public school systems in ways otherwise
unavailable.
If Professor James is right, however, to go down that road carries high
costs. It makes it much harder to backtrack, not just because policy must be
undone but because the political will to undo it will have been further
attenuated and redirected. Even if one believes that choice is a second-best
reform, one might abjure it for the roadblocks it places before the possibility
of ever reaching the first-best.
This is a genuine and important insight. It deserves to be highlighted
and studied further. But to the extent that this objection to choice is about
58. Id. at 1086, 1127.
59. See JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART 5–17 (2010); James E. Ryan,
Brown, School Choice, and the Suburban Veto, 90 VA. L. REV. 1635, 1645–47 (2004); James E. Ryan,
Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 566–67 (1999); James E.
Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2087–91
(2002).
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strategy, it needs to be analyzed in terms of realpolitik. One must assess the
potential political effects of commodification and of cultural-deficiency
thinking not only in terms of the political culture in general but of the
political baseline that determines American educational policy. For myself, I
am inclined to think that the baseline political potential of the kinds of
coalitions in the interest of which Professor James abjures choice is low
indeed. The utopian character of her vision is precisely what makes analysts
like Ryan propose to work within, rather than in opposition to, suburban
interests. (Indeed, a parallel utopianism with respect to educational equality
among 1970s “civil rights lawyers” spurred Professor Derrick Bell to develop
the theory of interest convergence in the first instance.60) As between
regimes of school choice as a second-best, even ones that carry the political
costs Professor James identifies, and hoping that distress within the
traditional public system will somehow generate a radical new education
politics, I opt for second best. Both history and politics make choice the
better gamble.
If we choose instead to reaffirm small-district localism, residence-based
assignment, and top-down, state-based bureaucratic school management,
educational policy will only continue to be shaped by decisions made in
response to the continued racial and economic subordination—as well as
the monopolist’s indifference to consumer preferences—that these
institutions impose and reflect. Ultimately, what choice is that?

60. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523, 532 (1980).

